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Summary findings
One of the main objectives of a sector investment (or  better to transfer the resources representing the cost of
expenditure) program is to improve the development  the service directly to the poor  (subsidizing  inefficient
impact of public spending in a sector. Suthiwart-  services is not propoor).  The good or service subsidized
Narueput  focuses on how to use economic analysis to  should be consumed more by the poor than by others,
help sector investment programs improve the  and within those services there should be a self-selection
development impact of public spending. He uses Kenya  mechanism that targets the services to the poorest. If
as a case study.  subsidized goods and services fail to meet these criteria,
The analysis emphasizes using standard principles of  spending should be directed toward other activities more
public expenditure analysis to identify desirable changes  likely to alleviate poverty.
in a sector spending program and to evaluate the degree  There  should be a reasonable relationship between
to which the planned spending program incorporates  spending and outcomes. Sometimes it is easiest to assess
those changes.  expenditure tradeoffs by looking at costs relative to other
One of the most important criteria is that such planned  benchmark interventions  (such as the cost of educating a
expenditures should have a clear public rationale,  child). In Kenya, for example, the budget for agricultural
motivated by a desire either to correct a market failure or  extension alone was double the entire budget for the
to alleviate poverty. Otherwise public spending simply  Ministry of Transport and Communications.
crowds out private investments, resulting in few net  Key economic indicators should reflect the key
benefits to the economy.  rationale: correcting for market failures or alleviating
Cost recovery may be considered desirable, for  poverty. Performance indicators should also be assessed
example, because it alleviates the government's  fiscal  relative tD a specific counterfactual (what would the
constraint, ensures that a good or service yields a  outcome have been without that expenditure). Control
minimum level of benefits, and encourages a supply  groups should be incorporated into program design from
response from the private sector. But if the private  the outset.
benefits of the service are less than the costs, it would be
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This paper discusses the economic analysis of  sector investment or  expenditure programs,
collectively referred to as SIPS  henceforth. There are many different views as to what actually
constitutes a siP. For the purposes of this paper, the essential feature of a SIP that we focus on
is that the Government, World Bank, and other donors jointly finance an agreed-upon forward
sectoral expenditure program.'  A SIP  may also have many different objectives. Again, for the
purposes of this paper, a critical objective of a SIP is to improve the development impact of
public expenditures in the sector. 2
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  proposes  a  methodology  for  the
economic analysis of  SIPS which  emphasizes evaluating the  sectoral  expenditure program
based on principles of public expenditure analysis. Particular emphasis is placed on identifying
the  rationale  for  public  intervention  and  improving  cost-recovery.  Section  3  discusses
alternative  methodologies,  e.g.,  cost-benefit  analysis.  Section  4  applies  the  proposed
methodology to the Kenya Agricultural SIP.  Section 5 concludes.
2. SIPs and Economic Analysis
Objective
While there are  several advantages to  a  SIP (e.g.,  improved donor coordination, increased
local ownership), 3 a critical objective of a SIP is to improve the development impact of public
expenditures in the sector through expenditure reallocation and process improvements. The
methodology for the economic analysis follows from this objective.
It is much more difficult for project-specific lending than SIPs  to improve the quality of
the  overall public expenditure portfolio. However,  it is precisely this  improvement which
represents the true development impact of World Bank lending because of the fungibility of
financial resources. A World Bank project may have a high net present value (NPV)  or internal
rate of return (MRu),  but this may not  represent the development impact of the loan. If the
World Bank  is funding  a project  which would have been undertaken  by  the  Government
anyway, the  World Bank  would implicitly be funding some  other, marginal project  which
could have a much lower NPV or IRR.
' This is only one aspect  of a sIp,  which  may also have  other important  features.  For the Africa  Region,  six
features define  a "genuine"  sip: (i) sectorwide  scope;  (ii) clear sector  strategy;  (iii)  led by local stakeholders;
(iv) participation  of all donors; (v) common  implementation  arrangements;  and (vi)  use of local capacity  rather
than technical  assistance.
2 Again, this is only  one of several  possible  objectives.  The Africa  Region  sees the siP  as "an instrument  for
overcoming  weakness  in the management  of development  assistance  ....  These  include lack of ownership  ...
weak public  expenditure  management,  and fragmented  management  of donor  assistance."  (Africa  region web
site).
3 See Harrold  et al. (1995).
4 See,  for example,  Devarajan,  Squire,  and Suthiwart-Narueput  (1997).  It should  be emphasized  that while a
SIP  may help address  intrasectoral  fungibility,  it does not address  intersectoral  fungibility.
IBy contrast,  improvements to the overall quality of the public expenditure portfolio
would have a large development impact. Reducing expenditures on unproductive  activities
could have as large a development impact as lending to increase expenditures on productive
ones. Hence the emphasis on expenditure reallocation. Nolte that since there is no necessary
analytical link  between  expenditure  reallocation  and  the  size  of  lending,  expenditure
reallocation via SiPs may be a way to maximize the development impact per dollar of World
Bank lending.
Methodology
The methodology  for the  economic analysis follows fromn  the  above  objective. First,  the
economic analysis should evaluate the current expenditure program to identify what changes
are appropriate. Second, the analysis should indicate how these changes are incorporated into
the  (forward)  expenditure  program  proposed  under  the  SIP. This  is  especially important
because the net benefits of the siP are given by the changes to the expenditure program, and
not by the quality of the overall expenditure program.
Evaluate the Public Expenditure Program
The economic analysis should  evaluate the  public expenditure program  to  determine the
appropriate changes to the proposed expenditure program. The reallocation of expenditures
should be guided by the following principles. First, there should be a clear public rationale for
public expenditure in the  sector. Expenditures  should be  clearly motivated on  grounds of
either  market  failure  (public goods  and  externalities) or  redistribution. Otherwise,  public
provision  simply crowds out  private  supply resulting in few net benefits to  the  economy.
Second, there should be a reasonable relationship between expenditures (costs) and outcomes
(benefits).
A useful first step is to  classify sectoral public expenditures in terms of whether they
are largely public (public goods and externalities) or largely private. Of course, the boundaries
between public and private are not  hard and fast,  and  such a  classification is ultimately a
matter of judgment. But it nonetheless focuses the discussion on the proper set of issues. A
useful starting point may be a three-part expenditure classification in terms of whether they
are "largely public," "largely private," or "private with large externalities."
The key test for public goods is nonexcludability. 5 If it is hard to exclude others from
enjoying the benefits of the good or service, e.g., national defense, rural roads, then it is likely
to be a public good. Expenditures on true public goods are likely to  be relatively limited. A
typical public expenditure program will include a large annount of expenditures  on private
goods and services, which the government may claim generates large externalities. 6 Because
externalities are difficult  to measure, debating the size of externalities associated with different
5Pure public  goods are those  whose  benefits  are also  nonrival, i.e., one's enjoyment  of that good  or service
does  not  take  away  from  another's  enjoyment  (e.g.,  an uncongested  public  park).
6Technically  speaking,  virtually all goods  have externalities.  When my colleague  purchases  and wears  an ugly
necktie,  he generates  negative  (consumption)  externalities  for me. However,  from a practical  standpoint,  no
one is likely  to recommend  a tax on the purchase  of private  goods such  as neckties,  no matter how  ugly they
are.
2types of expenditure could be counterproductive. A more fruitful approach may be to  focus
instead  on  improving cost  recovery  and  reducing net  public expenditure on  these  items.
Beneficiaries  of  public  expenditures  with  externalities nonetheless  receive  some  private
benefits from the expenditure. At a given level of government provision, cost recovery should
occur  up to  the level of the beneficiaries' willingness-to-pay regardless of the  size of the
externality.
In Figure 1 the government provides quantity Q, of a good with a positive externality.
Since the size of the externality is unknown, the marginal social benefit (MSB)  could be either
A  or B.  However,  the marginal private  benefit (MPB) is still C.  This is the  beneficiaries'
willingness-to-pay for the good. Given the quantity level, the government should charge the
MPB or the willingness-to-pay, P 1, regardless of the size of the externality. 7 Box  1 discusses
why charging for services and cost recovery is so important.
Figure 1
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7 Cost  recovery  is still only  partial since  there is a subsidy  corresponding  to the shaded  rectangle.
Absent equity  considerations,  which  are discussed  separately  below.
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This conclusion is not contingent upon providing the optimal quantity of the good. If
MSB is greater (less) than MC at that quantity, the government should increase (decrease) the
quantity provided. 9 However,  since the size of the externality and the location of MSB are
unknown, in general the optimal quantity to  provide will also be unclear. But  for any given
quantity, the government should charge the MPB or willingness-to-pay.
The  above  might  appear  to  contradict  the  usual  recommendation  that  goods  or
services with positive externalities should be  subsidized. Note  that the externality depends
upon the quantity consumed or provided. If this quantity does not  change in response to  a
subsidy, then there is no efficiency rationale for the subsidy. In the case where the good  or
service is provided by the private sector, a consumption subsidy BC will increase the quantity
provided from QO  to the socially efficient level Qi. In the case where the good  or service is
provided by the government-as  is the case here since it appears in the public expenditure
portfolio-there  is  no  guarantee  that  charging  less  will  increase  the  quantity  actually
consumed  or  provided.  A typical  situation with  many publicly provided  services is  that
quantities are rationed anyway because demand already exceeds supply since pricing is so low.
In such a situation, charging less simply results in an addiltional  transfer to the private sector
with little improvement in economic efficiency.
While less cost recovery may be justified on grounds of poverty alleviation, it should
pass several criteria. First, if the private benefits of the service are less than the costs, it would
be preferable to transfer the resources represented by the cost of the service directly to the
poor.  Subsidizing inefficient services is not  pro-poor.  Second,  the good  or  service being
subsidized should be consumed relatively more by the poor. Third, within those services, there
should be a self-selection or other mechanism which targets the services toward the poorest. If
9 If the true MSB curve  were MSB', for example, the government could improve welfare by increasing the
quantity  provided  to  Q2.
4subsidized goods and services fail to  meet these criteria, expenditures  should instead be
directed  toward other activities  which  may  have  a stronger  poverty  alleviation  impact.
There should also be a reasonable  relationship  between expenditures  and outcomes.
The analysis  can use either time-series  or cross-sectional  data to  assess whether increased
expenditures lead to  improved sectoral outcomes or  indicators. Have higher extension
expenditures  led to increases  in farm yields  or value added?  Have increased expenditures  on
teachers' salaries resulted in improved  literacy or enrollment  rates? In health, for example,
Hammer et  al. (1995) conducts a  cross-provincial  analysis of different types of public
expenditures  against such outcome measures  as infant mortality.  Interestingly,  he finds that
expenditures on  public doctors have a  negligible impact on  infant mortality, whereas
expenditures  on safe water and sanitation  have a very strong  beneficial  impact.
In the absence of sufficient  data to conduct expenditure-outcome  analyses,  selected
cosit-benefit  analyses  can indicate the relative desirability  of different types of interventions
(Box 2).
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ph  ta  dr~  fd  re  h:  "Hoj ;:i  5funded.  Goods and services  that are largely  private should  be privatized.  The phasing  out of
such activities  from the public portfolio should be clearly reflected  in the forward budget.
Goods and services  with large extemalities  may remain  in the forward expenditure  portfolio.
However,  pricing  and cost recovery  should  be improved.  Clear cost-recovery  targets for these
expenditure  items  should  be indicated  in the forward  budget.
Expenditures should also be reallocated to  reflect the  results of the expenditure-
outcome analysis.  In the case of health expenditures  discussed  above, for example,  if lower
infant  mortality  is the desired  outcome,  expenditures  should  be reallocated  away from publicly
provided  doctors and toward safe  water and sanitation.
The above discussion  focuses on the functional  composition  of expenditures  (i.e., by
program or activity). However, the forward budget should also reflect evaluation results
regarding the economic  (e.g., wage versus nonwage expenditures)  or geographic (e.g., by
province  or district)  composition  of expenditures.  A common  finding,  for example,  is that the
wage  bill crowds out  nonwage operations and  expenditure expenditures, resulting in
inefficient  service  delivery.  Another is that expenditures  on publicly  provided private goods
and services  tend to be biased toward richer rather than poorer areas. Such improvements  in
the economic  and geographic  composition  of expenditures  slhould  also be clearly  incorporated
into the proposed  expenditure  program.
Aside from expenditure  reallocation,  it may also be important  to incorporate  process
changes. Poor  observed expenditure-outcome  relationships may be  the  result of  high
inefficiency  in service  delivery.  Such  process improvements  could  include  institutional  changes
to improve  the incentives  for public  service  delivery.  While it is extremely  difficult  to know
what changes  are appropriate  (arguably  a strong candidate  for the Holy Grail of development
economics), setting  clear  and  binding performance criteria for  different expenditure
components  may at least encourage  appropriate incentives  among higher-level  government
officials.  Box 3 discusses  several  issues  pertaining  to performance  indicators.
Linking the forward budget with the evaluation results in this manner allows the
-Bo-x  3.  3Performance  Indicators
E.pend.itrereallocation should  be accompanied  by clear performance  critera. attached  to differe'nt
Jepe,nditur categories  in the forward  expenditure  program.'  nmi  muhhasbeen  tten abo't:''
performance  indicators  (see,  for-example,  the-Performance  Monitoring  Indicator  Handbook  issued  by
OPRIOCS),  there are-at  least two important  points  that often  get slighted  in:the usu  discussion  regardg..
input/output/outcome  indicators  (see Squire  et al. 1997).
First, the choice of which key indicators to -monitor shouldflow from the rationale fcr-the  expenditure  -:,.
As mentioned  earlier, in the-case-of  the public  expenditure  program, the choice  of indicator  'shoud liniik:.'i,.
b' '  ,ack  to one  of two rationales-market failure  andpoverty  alleviation.  An pnimr  education  projec,t
,.motivd  on  'extemnality  grounds should  focus  on the indicator  whichlmost- 'osely  drives the externit,:
ewg.,  bsic iliteracy. Conversely,.an  agricultural  extension  proj-ct motivated  o  povertyaleiA  ds
should Iocus  on household  inicome  among  poorer  farmers.
Second, performance  indicators need to be assessed relative to a well ,,speifed  counterfacta,  .., :'
what would  the  world  have looked  like in the absence  of that expenditue.,O-ne  `ay  to sPecilya
.counterfactual  is to construct  control groups.  Given  their importance  for monitoring  and  evaluati,  :control 
groups should  be incorporated  iinto  the designhof  the program  from the outset.
6economic analysis to  explicitly inform project  design, rather than act simply as an ex post
justification  for the project.  Of course,  to  a  large degree,  the forward  budget will reflect
political  rather  than  economic considerations. Nonetheless,  the  more  the forward  budget
incorporates the changes suggested by the expenditure evaluation, the greater the net benefits
of the SIP.  This is because the net benefits of a SIP  are given by the changes to the expenditure
program, and not of the expenditure program as a whole. The benefits and costs of the entire
expernditure program represent the  effect of total  government spending, where  the implicit
count.erfactual is no government spending. Because the benefits and costs of changes to the
program  represent  the effect of World Bank  participation, where  the  counterfactual is no
Worlid  Bank involvement, the latter is the relevant focus of the economic analysis.
Expenditure  changes  are  identified  by  comparing  the  proposed  forward  to  a
couniterfactual  expenditure program. By their nature, the latter is difficult to specify precisely
and requires considerable judgment. For example, should the counterfactual program include
donor financing? If it is believed, for example, that World Bank or donor financing would not
be forthcoming in the absence of a SIP, then the counterfactual expenditure program should
not  include World Bank  or  donor  financing. Furthermore,  even the  domestically financed
portion of the public expenditure program may itself change in response to  the  absence of
donor  financing. To  focus the analysis and avoid near-metaphysical speculation, it may be
more practical to assess first the changes relative to the historical expenditure program, then
discuss  the  major  areas  where  the  counterfactual program  is  likely to  diverge  from  the
historical program.
Conceptually, if we denote the net present value of the proposed expenditure program
under  the  SIP as  NPV1 and that  of the  counterfactual expenditure program as NPVo, the net
benefit of the SIP is NPV, - NPVo.  This has several  important  implications.  First, weaknesses  in
the current expenditure program do not in themselves argue against a siP. If the SiP leads to
significant positive changes to the expenditure program, the marginal development impact of
lending may be very high. Second, the size of the net benefits could have little to do with the
size  of  the loan.  Consider an  extreme example where  the  only change to  the expenditure
program is a reduction in unproductive expendittires. In this case, APv 1 > NPVo  and net benefits
are positive, but less funds are required. Third, while the net benefits are given by expenditure
changes, it most instances it will be very difficult to  quantify these net benefits in terms of a
NPV.  As discussed below, a cost-benefit analysis of an entire siP is likely to be rather difficult
and possibly even counter-productive.
3. Other  Approaches  to the Economic Analysis of SIPs
Cost-Benefit  Analysis
It is likely to be very difficult to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of an entire SIP. Since the net
benefits  of the SIP are given  by NPV1 - NPVo,  this would require  assessing  the net present  value
of  both  the  entire  factual  and  counterfactual  program  of  expenditures,  i.e.,
NPV, = I]  Zt (Bj, - Cjf) /(I  +r)'where  Bj, and Cjt refer to benefits and costs of project (or
component) j  at time t of expenditure program i. To do the former properly would be quite
impractical; the latter almost infeasible. To make the task feasible, one could assume that the
'7bulk of the expenditure program stays unchanged, and conly  assess the NPV of the projects or
components  which were  added or  dropped to  get  at  Vpv, - NPvo. However,  even this is
extremely  difficult  because  the  kinds  of  expenditure  changes  that  are  likely  to  be
recommended in a sIp are difficult to quantify in NPV terms. Three examples are discussed.
First, the proposed expenditure program should reduce expenditures on private goods
and services. But what is the value in NrPV  terms of eliminating private goods from the public
budget? At a minimum, this would require assessing the extent of crowding out  caused by
public provision, productivity and pricing differences between public and private  provision,
and the fiscal impact and distortionary cost of taxation.'" Second, a rationalized expenditure
program is also likely to  include reductions in  excess personnel and  increases in nonwage
expenditures.  Again,  the  NPV of  such a  reallocation would  be  very  difficult to  quantify
properly."  Lastly,  improving the  poverty  incidence of' expenditures  is  clearly beneficial.
However,  quantifying these benefits as a NPV  would require the use of distributional weights.
The appropriate set of weights to use is unclear, but would drive much of the result. Box 4
discusses other difficulties with cost-benefit analysis, withl  particular reference to agricultural
extension projects.
Break-Even  Growth  Rate:  Zambia  ASIP
The ex ante  economic  analysis  for the  Zambia  Agricultural  Sector  Investment  Program  (ASIP)
used  a different  approach  based  on  calculating  the  minimtum growth  rate  in  agricultural  GDP
required  to  justify  the  ASIP investment.  These  minimum  growth  rates  are  then  compared  to
historical  growth  rates  and total  factor  productivity  (TFP) growth  achieved  by other  countries
in the region  to justify  the investment.
There  are  several  problems  with  such  an approach  to  the  economic  analysis  of sips.
First,  the  calculation  requires  some  strong  assumptions  regarding  the  cost  and  benefit
streams. 12 Second,  the  methodology  implicitly favors  smaller  SiP investments  since the  break-
even  growth  rate  required  will be  correspondingly  lower.  Third  and  most  importantly,  this
type of economic analysis does not explicitly inform the design of the program.  For  example,
the  calculation  assumes  that  the current  level of expenditure  in the  sector  is the minimum  level
'  0 The reason  for the last is the following.  Initially,  let the private  goods  be provided  from the public  budget
below  cost, resulting  in a net fiscal drain. Suppose  that privatization  rneans  that the exact same goods  are now
privately  provided  on a commercial  basis. Absent  productivity  improvements,  the key difference  is that costs
previously  borne by the public  sector are now transfcrred  to private  consumers  of that good. In the presence  of
distortionary  costs of taxation,  there will be a net benefit  from increased  cost  recovery  or privatization  given  by
the lower  distortionary  costs of the reduced  fiscal  drain.
" The value of personnel  reductions  depends  upon the counterfactual.  Take the extreme  case where surplus
personnel  produce  nothing in the public sector,  but would  otherwise  be unemployed.  Absent  equity  and leisure
considerations,  the effect  of eliminating  such personnel  from the public  payroll  would  again be a reduction  in
the fiscal  drain previously  transferred  from the public  sector  to private agents.  If the surplus  personnel  could
find gainful  employment  (and private  labor markets  are undistorted),  then the benefit is given  by the full fiscal
impact, not  just the benefit  of the distortionary  costs of taxation associated  with the fiscal improvement.
12 On the cost side,  the incremental  cost of the AsIP program is calculated  as the difference  between  the total
cost  of ASIP and the minimum  level of public  expenditure  required  to maintain  agricultural  GDP at existing
levels,  which is assumed  to be the current  level of expenditure.  On the benefit  side, it is assumed  that the ASIP
investment  produces  constant  GDP growth  for a period of eight years.
8required  to maintain agricultural GDP at  existing  levels.  This  implicitly  assumes  that  there  are
no  unaproductive  sectoral  public  expenditures,  whereas  an  important  objective  of a  SIP is to
identify  and reduce  such expenditures.
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An economic analysis along the above lines was conducted  for the Kenya Agricultural SIP.
The following is not meant to be comprehensive, but indicative of the kind of analyses that
may be useful in the economic analysis of a SIP." 3
Evaluate Expenditures
The focus of the Kenya ASIP is on expenditures by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock
Development  and  Marketing  (MOALDM).1 4 Table  1  classifies ministry  expenditures  into
overhead  and  three  other  categories:  (i)  public goods;  (ii) private  goods  with  significant
externalities; and  (iii) private  goods.  Examples  of  expenditures  on  public goods  include
regulatory  (e.g.,  Kenya  Plant  Health  Inspectorate,  holding ground  services)  and  disease
control (e.g., tsetse and tick control services) functions. Expenditures on private goods with
significant externalities include training  institutes  and  extension  services. Expenditures  on
largely private goods and services include artificial insemination, agricultural mechanization,
and veterinary clinical services. While any precise classification is a matter of judgment,  it
appears reasonably clear that  a large proportion  of  MOALDM expenditures is on  nonpublic
goods and services.
Table 1. MOALDM  ExpenditUres
(percent)
KP OOOs  Actual 1995/96
Shares
Overhead  16
Largely public  17*
Private  with externalities  56
Largely private  12*
*  Preliminary.
Source:  MOALDM  forward  budget;  discussions  with MOALDM  staff; World Bank analysis.
Given the high proportion of expenditures on nonpublic goods, the potential for cost
recovery is significant.  However, current levels of cost recovery are extremely low. Total sales
and fees were only about 1 percent of total gross ministry expenditures.'5 If we instead focus
only on the subset of expenditure items where there was currently some cost recovery, sales
and fees represented  less than 6 percent of gross or 8 percent of recurrent  expenditures on
those  items.  Several of  these  services yield largely private,  excludable benefits for  which
increased cost  recovery is both  feasible and desirable. Artificial insemination services and
veterinary clinical services, for example, each recovered only about 3 percent of their costs. At
a minimum, such services should recover much of their operating (recurrent) expenditures.
As  discussed  above,  less  cost  recovery  may  be justified  on  grounds  of  poverty
alleviation. However, while a full poverty assessment was not  possible, it does not  appear
13  For  a more  detailed  and comprehensive  analysis,  see  Suthiwart-Narueput  (forthcoming).
14 Related  sectoral  expenditures  (e.g.,  rural  roads)  are  covered  under  other  projects  under  preparation.
15  The data are from FY ending  6/30/95  which were the most recent actual expenditures  (as opposed  to budget
estimates)  available  at the time of the mission.
10likely  that current ministry  expenditures  have a strong impact on poverty alleviation.  First,
many of the goods and services  being subsidized  do not seem to be those likely  to be used
more heavily by poorer farmers. Subsidizing  artificial insemination  services, for example,
benefits relatively  well-off  farmers  with more breeding  animals  more than poorer ones, who
will have fewer stock. Similarly,  subsidizing  tractor hire services  is likely to benefit richer
farmers  more than poorer ones
Second,  there appears  to be no mechanism  by which services  are targeted toward the
poorest.1 6 In the absence of more detailed data, Chart 1 plots staffing  against the poverty
headcount ratio (ratio of  number of  poor individuals  to  total  number of  individuals  in
population surveyed) by  district.1 7 The analysis clearly indicates that  resources are not
targeted toward poorer districts.  One obvious  objection  is that poorer districts  may  have little
agricultural  potential  which do not warrant targeting much MOALDM  resources. However, it
implies limited  justification for ministry expenditures  on poverty alleviation  grounds, and
argues strongly  for much  larger cost recovery.
Chart  1. Staffing  and Poverty  by District
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Source:  Central Bureau  of Statistics,  Poverty  in Kenya;  Staffing  Norns Study.
Given the data available, it was not  possible to  perform a full-fledged expenditure-
outcome analysis.  In the absence of information  regarding  the relationship  between outputs
and  outcomes,  we focus  instead on  the relationship between  inputs  and  outputs.  As  one
indication of technical efficiency within extension, Table 2 lists summary statistics regarding
the annual number of farm and group visits per agricultural staff by district. The number of
farm and group visits per  agricultural assistant (AA) and assistant agricultural officer (AAO),
for example, varies hugely by district, from a low of 15 to  a high of 715, with a mean and
16  Inieed, given the inadequate  state of data at the ministry,  it is not clear how  services  could  be effectively
targeted  toward  the poor.
17 Note that the chart actually  understates  this effect  because  they exclude  urban areas such as Nairobi,  which
has by far the highest  number  of staff  (1,538).
11median  of 268 and 226. The median  number  of visits  work:s  out to less than one  visit per staff
per working day.' 5 By any measure, this appears to  indicate a  rather low level of staff
productivity.
Table 2. Farm  and Group  Visits  per Agricultural  Staff
Farr/AA  Farm/AAO,  AA  Farrn,  Group/AAO,  AA
Median  278.9  217.9  228.1
Mean  319.7  249.6  268.4
Minimum  13.7  11.6  14.5
Maximum  868.1  710.2  714.8
Source:  Department  of  Agriculture  Provincial  Annual  Reports  1995,  1996;  Staffing  Norms  Study.
While it may be argued that much of the low productivity  was due to  insufficient
funding  for transportation  for extension  workers (e.g., fuel and vehicle  maintenance),  this is a
problem  of poor resource allocation  and management  rather than of inadequate  resources  per
se. It is difficult  to argue that extension  as a whole receives  insufficient  resources. Under  the
1997/98  estimates,  the extension  core function  cost 141.9  million  KP. This is far greater than
the  entire  budget  (recurrent and  development) for  the  Ministry  of  Transport  and
Communications  (70.1 million  in the 1996/97  estimates).
Since  a full expenditure-outcome  analysis  was not possible,  we also rely upon selected
cost-benefit  analyses.  Detailed, representative  farm budgets from four agro-ecological  zones
(AEZ)  are used to  conduct cost-benefit  analyses  (CBA) sumrnmarized  in Table 3. Given the
limitations  of cost-benefit  analysis  discussed  above, the focus is less on deriving  exact return
figures,  but instead  on the implications  for intervention.
Table 3. Indicative  Benefit-Cost  Analysis
(Ksh  per  representative  farm)
Best  Soil,  water
Agro-ecological  zone  Baseline practice/extension  Seeds  Crop  mix  conservation
Profits  from  increased  yields
Upper  highlands  45,779  65,409  47,478  56,997  64,045
Upper  midlands  92,061  178,114  92,781  120,231  118,715
Lower  midlands  11,498  16,816  18,854  11,498  20,790
LM and below  5,545  8,707  8,06:3  5,545  7,805
Estimated  IRRS*
Upper  highlands  42%  (+)  (+)  45%
Upper  midlands  >100%  (+)  >100%
Lower  midlands  -18%  (+,  nil  (-)
LM  and  below  (-)  (+H  nil  (-)
*  Includes  estimates  of  on-farm  and  public  costs;  (+/-)  indicates  +/-  return  with  undefined  IRR.
While  purely indicative,  the analysis  yields several  interesting  implications.  First, there
are  several interventions  which have limited budgetary implications  but  yield substantial
s Excluding  holidays.  Given  the extreme  range of values,  the median  may be a better overall indicator.
12benefits. These include improving  the access of small-scale  farmers to  improved seeds by
lifting  import restrictions  on seed, and encouraging  changes  in crop mix from maize to cash
crops in the Upper  Highlands  (UH)  and  Upper  Midlands  (UM).
Second,  incremental  farm profits are much higher in the Upper Highlands  and Upper
Midlands,  but much lower in the Lower Midlands and Lower Midlands and Below. This
suggests that (i) interventions  in the former  two AEzs  have the potential  for substantial  cost
recovery; and (ii) alternative  interventions  for poverty alleviation  may be preferable  in the
latter two AEZs.
Third, there appears  to be a very large yield gap between average  and best practice.
The best practice/extension  column  provides  an indication  of the incremental  profits  that could
potentially  be realized  if optimal  techniques  were employed  on the representative  farms in the
four AEZs.  The last column indicates the incremental  profits from increased yields due to
improved  soil and water conservation.  In the uHM, the benefits  for both interventions  are so
high  that  if  realized,  they completely overwhelm the  costs  of  intervention. For  best
practice/extension,  for example,  even if it is assumed  that benefits  are realized  with only a 20
percent probability,  the iRRs are extremely  high.  This suggests  that at least in the UH  and UM,
the critical  issue is less  the cost per extension  visit,  but whether the benefits  will be realized  or
not.
Incorporate  Results  into Forward  Budget
At the time of writing,  the Kenya ASIP  forward  budget has not been finalized.  However,  to
incorporate  the results of the above  analysis,  the proposed  budget  should  reflect  the following:
Privatization  of  goods  and  services which  are  largely private  in  character (e.g.,
artificial  insemination  and veterinary  clinical  services).  Within the appropriate time-
frame,  there should  be no allocation  from the public  budget for these types of goods
and services.  The actual time-profile  of expenditure  allocation  will depend upon the
particular  activity.  In certain  cases, allocations  may increase  in the near term to fully
fund the  activity to  facilitate privatization. In  other instances it  may be  more
appropriate  first to commercialize  the activity  and then reduce the size of the public
subsidy  gradually  over time.
*  Increased cost recovery for many goods and services (e.g., training  schools,  extension
services).  Other things equal, this should translate into reduced net expenditure  on
these  services in  the  forward budget. Explicit cost  recovery targets  should be
established  by activity  and by year (e.g., as a percentage  of operating  expenses).  The
precise  level of cost recovery  may  be a matter of some  debate,  but the fact  that current
levels are so low provides  a lot of room  to maneuver.
*  Reallocation  to  improve  incidence  of  expenditures  on  poverty.  There are  two
dimensions:  by item and district.  Net expenditures  should be reallocated away from
goods and services  that are more likely  to be used by better-off farmers  (e.g., tractor
hire or agricultural  mechanization  services) and from richer districts. Note that the
emphasis  is on net rather than gross allocations.  Whereas  richer districts are likely  to
have higher agricultural  potential  and warrant more resources, cost recovery  can also
13be improved  in these areas. The CBA using representative  farm budgets also suggests
that extension  may  not be the best way of alleviating  poverty in certain  AEZs.
Aside from expenditure  reallocation,  the analysis  also suggested the need for several
process improvements.  The low levels of technical efliciency observed in extension, for
example, probably reflect both  poor  budgeting (e.g.,  inadequate releases of  nonwage
operating  expenditures  to allow  extension  visits  to take place), as well as limited  incentives  for
efficient service delivery. The sip incorporates two  important process improvements  to
address  these deficiencies.
*  The budget will  be  reordered  to  represent  the  core  versus noncore functions  of  the
government in the sector. This will help get critical services fully-funded  before less
critical  services.
*  A new, district-level, activity-based budgeting system will be introduced on a pilot  basis
for  13 districts. This will link explicit  performance  criteria to  improve monitoring  and
accountability.  While  technical  efficiency  is low, performance  criteria  should  focus heavily
on impact  and outcome  indicators  (e.g.,  yield improvements  and increased  farm  household
incomes)  as opposed  to process  indicators  (e.g., number  of visits  per worker). As the CBA
for extension  indicated,  the benefits  from improved  yields-if  realized-overwhelm any
reasonable  cost per visit.  This suggests  that the critical  risk in extension  is less the cost per
visit  but that the benefits  fail  to get realized.
By and large, many  of the above  changes  are not reflected  in the forward budget as it
currently stands. Improved cost recovery, for example, should be clearly reflected as  a
separate budget category for each activity.  Expenditure  allocations  should be tracked at the
district level to assess  whether  they are "pro-poor" or not. This partly reflects the limitations
of the current budgeting  system,  and some of these deficiencies  may be alleviated  as a new,
district-level,  activity-based  budgeting system  is introduced  on a pilot basis for 13 districts.
This new system  will also allow expenditures  to be linked  to explicit  performance  criteria  to
improve monitoring and accountability. It is difficult to see how many of the needed changes
could  be  implemented  under  the current  budgeting  system.  This suggests  that  the  new,
district-level, activity-based budgeting system is an absolutely critical component of the ASIP.
However, even within the confines of the current budgeting system, the forward
budget inadequately  reflects desirable  changes.  First, and most importantly,  there is still far
too much emphasis  in the forward budget on private rather than public  goods. The share of
public  goods does not seem  to increase  at all, while  the share of largely  private goods does.
Second,  the budget headings  are still  fragmented.  This makes the total amount of resources
going  toward particular  activities  less transparent.  Veterinary  services  and livestock  extension
and marketing,  for example, appear across several different core functions. It  should be
emphasized  from the outset that the following  figures  and analyses  are preliminary.  However,
-the qualitative  findings  are not likely  to be reversed  with more precise  figures.
We classify  MOALDM expenditures  into whether they are overhead; largely public;
private with large externalities;  and largely private. Table 4 compares the relative shares in
1995/96  (the last year for which actual  expenditures  are currently  available)  with the relative
shares in the 3-year, 1998/2001  forward budget. Two features emerge.  First, the share of
public  expenditures  in the forward budget is quite low at 17 percent. Second, the share of
14expenditures which are public remains unchanged from  1995/96 to  1998/2001. By contrast,
the share of expenditures on largely private goods actually increases from 12 to  17 percent.
The latter is particularly worrisome because the impact of the sIP depends upon changes to the
expenditure portfolio.
Table 4. MOALDM  Expenditures
(percent)
Actual  Estimated  Projected  Total
KP OOOs  1995/96  1997/98  1998/99  1998/01
Shares
Overhead  16  17  17  15
Largely  public  17*  18  15  17*
Private  with externalities  56  54  49  51
Largely  private  12*  1  20  17*
* Preliminary.
It is also useful to analyze the decomposition of the expenditure changes. Total actual
expenditures were 200 million  KP (actual) in 1995/96, and are 320 million  KP in 1998/99, the
first year of the 3-year forward budget. This represents a nominal increase of 120 million  KP.
Table 5 provides a partial list of how this increase is distributed. These four items or areas
alone account for over 70 percent of the net increase in expenditures between  1995/96 and
1998/99. The nature of the increases is worrisome. Over 20 percent  of the increase are on
largely  private  goods  with  few  externalities-cold  storage  facilities  and  pig  production
services.  Another  30  percent  is on  extension, which while  it may generate  externalities,
provides largely private benefits. Nearly another 20 percent is on general administration and
planning, which consists largely of overhead rather than directly productive services. Because
general administration and planning should have a large fixed cost component, it is not clear
why ilt  should account for such a large share of the increase in expenditures.
Table  5. MOALDM  Expenditures
(percent)
Distribution  of 120  million  expenditure  increase  from 1995/96-1998/99
Agricultural  extension'  30.0
General  administration  & planning  18.7
Construction  of cold  storage  facilities  14.8
District  pig production  services  6.6
Subtotal  70.1
1.  Includes  the  following  budget  codes:  237.000,  238.000,  634.000,  635.000,  660.000,  661.000,  235.000,
255.001),  638.000,  639.000,  271.000.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on how to use economic analysis to  help Sips improve the
development impact of public expenditures. The analysis emphasized using standard principles
of  public  expenditure  analysis to  identify desirable  changes  to  the  sectoral  expenditure
program, and evaluating the degree to which the forward expenditure program under the SIP
incorporates  these  changes.  One  of  the  most  important  criteria  is  that  such  forward
15expenditures  should have a  clear public rationale,  motivated on grounds  of  either  market
failure or poverty alleviation.
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